The profitability motivated risk/return dynamics of non-dividend paying firms is distinct from dividend paying firms. We find no evidence of limited growth opportunities that would otherwise induce low returns for high profitability companies. Rather, in a dynamic equity valuation model, expected return for non-dividend paying firms is the forward rate of return on equity (ROE) plus a term that depends on earnings volatility. Because of constraints that restrict external financing, firms finance growth investments internally, but only when profitability permits. These investments increase risk. Consistent with this model, we find high returns for high profitability, high market/book, growth-stocks. High return combined with high market/book is a negative value premium for non-dividend paying companies. When we benchmark the returns of portfolios formed by ranking forward ROE and return volatility against a conditional asset-pricing model, we find negative abnormal returns for low risk value-stocks and positive abnormal returns for high risk growth-stocks. While rational financial-economic analysis guides our empirical investigation, we cannot rule out market-inefficiency as an explanation for abnormal returns. Either equity-markets over-price low-risk stocks and underprice high-risk stocks or current asset-pricing models do not fully capture the negative valuepremium for non-dividend paying companies. ______________________________________________________________________________ Keywords: Equity investing, portfolio management, analysts' forecasts.
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Introduction
argues that corporations exist to organize the information gathering tasks of employees required for deployment of capital from investors when decision making is delegated to corporate managers who have developed this skill for the mutual benefit of all. Arrow attributes limited growth to the organizational costs of coordinating information processing and communication which exhibit dis-economies of scale. Tobin (1969) also presumes limits to corporate growth because q-market value of assets per dollar of replacement cost-exceeds unity, as it often does, only if these limits exist. Blazenko and Fu (2010) argue that the source of the value-premium-high returns for value compared to growth firms-is limits to growth. Limited growth opportunities restrict corporate managers from using high profitability to enhance growth which instead "covers" the ongoing costs of growth capital expenditures and reduces risk. Thus, high profitability growth firms, with great market/book, have lower risk and lower returns than value firms. Blazenko and Fu (2010) report supporting evidence for dividend paying companies.
In the pecking order hypothesis for corporate financing, companies pay dividends when they have no need to retain earnings to finance growth which suggests that they face limited growth prospects.
The same argument cannot be made for non-dividend paying companies. Thus, Blazenko and Fu's (2010) limits-to-growth hypothesis for the value premium does not apply to non-dividend paying companies. Because Blazenko and Fu do not consider non-dividend paying companies, we investigate the value premium for non-dividend paying companies in this paper.
The decision by corporate managers not to pay dividends is evidence of financing constraints (e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993) that impede the development of unbounded (or at least less limited) growth opportunities. Profitability allows these firms to finance internally when they cannot finance externally, which increases growth, growth leverage, and return. Because high market/book companies have high profitability, the principal hypothesis that we test in this paper is that there is no value premium for non-dividend paying companies.
To structure this hypothesis, we investigate a dynamic equity valuation model for a non-dividend paying firm which predicts that expected return is the forward rate of return on equity (ROE) plus a term that depends on earnings volatility. We find no evidence of limited growth opportunities that would otherwise induce low returns for high profitability companies. Rather, we find that high market/book growth stocks have high ROEs (with consensus analysts' earnings forecasts) and high returns which is consistent with unbounded growth opportunities constrained by financing and 2 undertaken only when profitability permits. High returns for growth stocks compared to value stocks is a negative value premium for non-dividend paying companies. Thus, we find that the profitability motivated risk/return dynamics of firms differs depending upon whether or not they pay dividends.
The literature on the relation between returns and profitability includes Haugen and Baker (1996) who use past equity returns as a proxy for corporate profitability to find that past ROE is an important determinant of expected return in a return characteristic model. Fama and French (2006) investigate profitability as a determinant of expected return. They use lagged accounting information and proxies of firm characteristics to predict profitability and then use this prediction in a cross-sectional return characteristic regression. They find that although lagged accounting information can predict future profitability, this prediction has little explanatory power for returns. Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) develop a three factor return model (a market factor, a factor for historical profitability, and an investment factor) as an alternative to Carhart's (1997) four factor model that includes the three Fama and French (1996) factors plus a momentum factor. They find that in some circumstances, their three factor model with profitability explains equity returns better than Carhart's (1997) four factor model.
Rather than using historical earnings, we use analysts' earnings forecasts for corporate profitability in forward ROE. We find that ROE relates positively with realized returns. Last, our development of the limits-to-growth hypothesis for returns predicts, and we present supporting evidence, that the relation between returns and profitability differs depending upon whether or not firms pay dividends.
The financial literature documents a number of ways in which firms that do and do not pay dividends differ. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) find that non-dividend paying firms have high market/book ratios, high return volatility, and high profit volatility. Fama and French (2001) find that non-dividend paying firms have low profitability, strong growth opportunities, and are smaller in size. Rubin and Smith (2009) find that non-dividend paying firms tend to be younger in age, smaller in size, more leveraged, and more volatile in daily returns than dividend paying firms. In addition to these differences, we find that non-dividend paying firms have a negative value premium.
Evidence of a value premium is abundant in US and international capital markets. Fama and French (1992) find that the value premium exists for post-1963 U.S. stock returns. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) find a value premium for Japanese firms. Fama and French (1998) find that value stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of thirteen international markets in the period 1975-1995. There are several explanations for the value premium: financial distress, growth-option exercise, investment irreversibility, and limits to growth. First, French (1998, 2007) argue that the 3 value-premium reflects financial distress. Garcia-Feijoo and Jorgensen (2007) show that degree of operating leverage (which depends upon profitability) relates positively with book/market and is an important determinant of the value premium. Second, Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) find that the market/book ratio relates to the recent capital expenditures. High market/book growth firms have large past capital expenditures which they interpret as the exercise of growth options which reduces risk. Consistent with this interpretation, they find low average returns for these firms. Fama and French (2007) argue that market/book declines for growth firms because they have just exercised growth options. On the other hand, value firms restructure to improve their profitability which increases market/book. This market/book convergence increases return for value firms and decreases return for growth firms. Third, Zhang (2005) argues that the flexibility of growth options compared to irreversibility of in-place assets makes value-firms riskier than growth-firms. Fourth, Blazenko and Pavlov (2009) and Blazenko and Fu (2010) argue that the source of the value-premium is limits to growth. High profitability for growth firms covers the fixed costs of growth capital expenditures which reduces risk. In the current paper, we argue that growth opportunities are less limited for nondividend paying firms than they are for dividend paying firms. Thus, we test for a negative valuepremium for non-dividend paying stocks.
Recent literature documents a negative relation between past idiosyncratic return volatility and future returns (Ang et. al 2006 (Ang et. al , 2009 . Barinov (2010) argues that high idiosyncratic volatility decreases the beta of growth options, which decreases expected return. Studies show that, analysts' forecast dispersion as a volatility measure has a negative relation with future returns which Han and Manry (2000) , Diether et. al (2002) , Johnson (2004) , Sadka and Scherbina (2007) and Avramov et. al (2009) attribute to information asymmetry, short-sale constraints, the option value of the equity, market liquidity, and financial distress, respectively. For non-dividend paying firms, we find no strong relations between the profitability motivated changes in the measures of volatility that we investigate and equity returns. This evidence suggests that any relation between returns and volatility is encompassed in the relation between returns and profitability that we investigate.
We find negative abnormal returns for low risk value-stocks and positive abnormal returns for high risk growth-stocks. Rational financial-economic analysis guides our empirical investigation, but we cannot dismiss market-inefficiency as an abnormal-return explanation. To do so would bias future scientific inquiry that our research might inspire. Either equity-markets over-price low-risk stocks and under-price high-risk stocks or current asset-pricing models do not fully capture the negative value premium for non-dividend paying companies.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a dynamic equity valuation model for non-dividend paying firms which predicts that expected return is the forward rate of return on equity (ROE) plus a term that depends on earnings volatility. In sections 3 and 4 we empirically investigate the relations between the value premium and corporate profitability predicted by our dynamic model. In section 5, we investigate whether or not investors anticipate the negative value premium for non-dividend paying stocks. Section 6 concludes, summaries our findings, and suggests topics for future research.
Dynamic Financial Analysis
Preliminaries
When earnings growth requires capital growth, Blazenko and Pavlov (2009) value the equity of a company whose manager has a dynamic option to suspend and recommence growth indefinitely. If the return on equity (ROE) falls below a hurdle rate, then the value maximizing manager suspends growth. If ROE rises above this hurdle rate, the manager recommences growth at a fixed rate g>0.
They use this model to show that the endogenously determined cost of capital uniformly exceeds the value maximizing hurdle rate for growth which means that the cost of capital is an unduly conservative benchmark for corporate growth. An important assumption that leads to this result is limited growth which, in their model, means that when a firm grows, it grows at a maximum rate g. In their study of dividend paying firms, Blazenko and Fu (2010) find that high profitability growth firms have lower returns than low profitability value firms. They argue that high profitability growth firms do not need this profitability to fund growth, but instead high profitability "covers" the ongoing costs of limited growth capital expenditures which reduces both risk and return for growth firms compared to value firms.
Equity Valuation
We believe that there are two important differences between dividend paying firms and nondividend paying firms. First, because they pay no dividends, non-dividend paying firms are more likely financially constrained. Second, the pecking order hypothesis for business financing suggests that because non-dividend paying firms use earnings to finance investment before they pay dividends, dividend paying firms face limits on their business growth opportunities. We incorporate these two presumptions about dividend paying versus non-dividend paying companies in a dynamic three state growth model for equity valuation in an extension of the dynamic equity valuation model of Blazenko and Pavlov (2009) . In the first state, when profitability (ROE) is modest, the corporate manager does not grow the business. In the second state, when ROE is greater, the corporate manager uses all of earnings for retention, reinvestment, and growth, and the corporate growth rate equals ROE. In the third state, when ROE is high, the business faces limited growth prospects and, thus, the manager pays dividends at the rate ROE-g>0 above that required to fund growth g. The corporate manager chooses value maximizing boundaries between these three states so that he/she can suspend growth, grow at the maximum rate that internal financing allows (ROE), or grow at the maximum rate that business opportunities allow (g>0), indefinitely. We report the technical development of this equity valuation model in appendix A.
Equity Return
When a constant returns to scale technology with stochastic return on equity, 
Return matching between states (branches) in a real options model ensures no arbitrage opportunities at these junctures (Shackleton and Sødal, 2005) . These conditions in equation (1) Last, if the business has the financial capacity for growth (that is, ROE>g which is the right-most section in Panel B of Figure 1 ), but is constrained by business opportunities to grow at a maximum rate g, then expected return, () ROE  , decreases with ROE. Growth opportunities limited to an investment rate (g) restrict corporate managers from using high profitability to enhance growth which instead "covers" the ongoing costs of limited growth capital expenditures which reduces risk.
When the manager has suspended growth investments (the left-most section in Panel B of Figure   1 ), he/she pays dividends at the maximum rate allowed by profitability, ROE. Even though corporate profitability (ROE) is low and the manager does not need immediate cash to fund growth (which has been suspended), and, thus, he/she pays earnings as a dividend, recognizing financing constrains on future investment, he/she has an incentive to stock-pile cash from earnings (ROE) to fund future growth once profitability stochastically improves. .
VOL(ROE)
increases with ROE when ROE is low, but decreases with ROE when ROE is high. While the relation between VOL(ROE) and ROE is not monotonic, it is 0 as ROE approaches 0 from the right and it is positive (approximately 6%) when ROE is high (that is, ROE=9% which is just before the firm starts to pay dividends). We interpret these observations to mean that for non-dividend paying firms, volatility is a more important determinant of expected return when ROE is high.
Our model, represented by Figure 1 , predicts that both returns (ω) and the market-to-book ratio (π) for non-dividend paying companies increase with profitability (ROE). Combining these two predictions, it also predicts that high market-to-book growth firms have high returns and low marketto-book value firms have low returns. This is a negative value premium for non-dividend paying firms. This is the principal hypothesis that we test in the remainder of this paper. 
_________________________________________________________________________________
Portfolio Selection Criteria
Because ROE entails division by BVE, we require positive BVE from the latest reported quarterly or annual financial statements immediately prior to portfolio inclusion. To avoid bias in ROE arising from extremely small BPS, we require BPS greater than one dollar. In addition, because our dynamic model presumes that ROE follows a geometric Brownian motion and is, thus, always positive, we require positive trailing twelve month reported earnings. Last, we restrict our testing to firms that have paid no dividends in the trailing twelve months from the time of portfolio formation.
Portfolios and Forward ROE
The I/B/E/S database reports a snapshot of analysts' earnings forecasts for the Thursday preceding that we rebalance at closing prices on Statistical Period dates. We define a "statistical period month"
as the interval between adjacent statistical period dates.
We forecast ROE in three ways with three different consensus I/B/E/S analysts' EPS forecasts at a
Statistical Period date. 5 These EPS forecasts are for the first, 6 second, and third (J=1,2,3) yet to be forecasts are positive and increase monotonically from portfolio b=1 to b=25 for each of the sets of portfolios J=1,2,3.
Portfolio Returns
We measure portfolio returns from a Statistical Period date, where we form a portfolio, to the 
where P t and P t+1 are closing share prices 10 on Statistical Period date t and t+1, and D t+1 is the dividend per share that has an ex-date between the Statistical Period Dates t and t+1. We adjust both the dividend D t+1 and the end of month share price P t+1 for stock splits and stock dividends.
The equally weighted portfolio return in statistical period month t=1,2,…,TP, for portfolio
Because ROE is an annual measure, for comparison purposes in MB , the median market value of equity for the twenty five portfolios (b=1,2,…,25), sorted by J ROE , J=1,2,3, respectively. As one might expect, low profitability firms (b=1) tend to have lesser market to book ratios than do high profitability firms (b=25). In addition, other than when profitability is very low, the market to book ratio increases for ROE portfolios. This increase reflects the fact that analysts more likely forecast EPS further in the future for growth compared to value firms and suggests that analysts have an inherent preference for growth stocks over value stocks as argued by Haugen (1999) .
Volatility Versus Returns
We investigate four volatility measures: analysts' earnings forecast dispersion, past return volatility, volatility of the level of earnings, and volatility of the rate of earnings change. Since volatility of the rate earnings change is closest to the parameter σ in the Brownian motion for the ROE process in equation (A2) Figure 1. Fama-MacBeth (1973) asset pricing, then either investors or these models do not recognize the negative value premium for non-dividend paying stocks.
The Negative Value-Premium
Non-dividend paying firms are generally more volatile than dividend paying firms (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; Rubin and Smith 2009 ). In addition, recent literature (e.g., Ang et. al 2006 Ang et. al , 2009 Barinov 2010; Han and Manry, 2000; Diether et. al, 2002; Johnson, 2004; Sadka and Scherbina, 2007; Avramov et. al, 2009 ) documents a negative relation between volatility and future returns. In section 2, our dynamic model predicts that expected return is the forward rate of return on equity (ROE) plus a term that depends on earnings volatility. Further, preliminary results in Table 1 suggest that both profitability and volatility are important determinants of returns. In this section, we investigate whether these relations are "abnormal" or subsumed in the factors used in standard asset pricing models by investigating portfolios that we form by a double sort of profitability (ROE) and volatility on Statistical Period dates. We use past return volatility as our volatility measure in this section, ( 
Normal Returns
The negative value premium reported in Table 2 may be risk compensation and does not assure abnormal returns for investment strategies based on ROE and volatility if investors recognize the negative value-premium for non-dividend paying stocks. We test for abnormal returns in this section.
We use a conditional four factor asset pricing model to represent normal returns.
14 The four factor model explains expected returns with a Book/Market factor, a size factor, a momentum factor, and a market factor. Fama and French (1996) suggest a Book/Market factor, a size factor, and a market factor. The Book/Market factor is the return difference between portfolios of high Book/Market (value) and low Book/Market (growth) firms. The economic rationale for a Book/Market factor is that it represents distressed companies that have had poor operating performance in the recent past and that, therefore, have higher than normal leverage. Reinganum (1981 Reinganum ( , 1983 and Banz (1981) report evidence that small firms have great investment risk with higher returns than can be explained by financial models of the time. Fama and French's (1996) size factor is the return difference between portfolios of small and large cap firms. The CAPM justifies a market factor, which we measure with an index that represents the market portfolio less a risk-free interest rate. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report evidence that momentum investment strategies that take long (short) positions in stocks that have had good (poor) share price performance in the recent past earn higher returns than can be explained by financial models of the time. Following, Carhart (1997), we include a momentum factor − the return difference between portfolios of "winners" and "losers."
Unconditional asset pricing models, like, Fama and French (1996) and Carhart (1997) , presume that expected returns and factor loadings are constant over time. However, Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Ferson and Warther (1996) present evidence that economic variables like the lagged aggregate 14 We also tested for abnormal returns with the three factor model of Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) that has a market factor, a factor for historical profitability and an investment factor (results not reported). Estimated alphas tend to be consistently positive which suggests a missing factor. Because non-dividend paying firms tend to be smaller than dividend paying firms (e.g., French, 2001, Rubin and Smith, 2009) , because small firms tend to have greater returns than large firms, and because evidence in Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) suggests that their models does not explain the small firm effect, it appears that this missing factor is related to firm size. Because of this bias, we do not report results. Further, it is beyond the scope of our paper to search for new and better asset-pricing models.
dividend yield and the risk free rate capture variation in both risk and expected returns. Ferson and Harvey (1999) use these common lagged information variables in the Fama and French (1996) that we use to benchmark portfolios formed by a double sort of forward profitability (ROE) and volatility.
We risk-adjust the 25 ROE and volatility sorted portfolios with four risk factors in the regression model:
, , , (3) and (4) for portfolios formed with ROE and volatility.
Null Hypothesis
In this section, we discuss multivariate tests of abnormal returns , the  s, of equation (3) and (4) and equation (5) and (6). The purpose of the Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) (GRS) test is to search for pricing errors in an asset pricing model. We use the GRS statistic to test the null hypothesis that the regression intercepts are jointly equal to zero, 1
The alternative hypothesis is that there is a missing factor in the asset pricing model.
Hansen's J statistic (Hansen 1982) tests the null hypothesis that abnormal returns, the  s, are jointly equal to one another 15 , 1 2 3 4 5            , but not necessarily equal to zero. The purpose of Hansen's J test is to identify the differences in abnormal returns. A rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that investors can discriminate portfolio performance in such a way as to form profitable investment strategies. In our case, Hansen's J statistic is χ 2 distributed with degree of freedom equal to 4 (number of restrictions minus one) for ROE 1 , ROE 2 , and ROE 3 portfolios.
Abnormal Returns
We now turn to abnormal return evidence-non-zero alphas-for the portfolios formed with ROE and volatility. Table 3 reports abnormal returns from the conditional Fama-French-Carhart four factor asset pricing model.
In Table 3 ,  for lowest ROE quintile (k=1) is always negative, but sometimes statistically significant and sometimes not. On the other hand,  for middle ROE portfolio (k=3) is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but mostly statistically insignificant. Finally,  for the highest ROE quintile (k=5) is always positive, but sometimes statistically significant and sometimes not.
15 Following the methodology in Cochrane (2001, pp. 201-264) , the J statistic is 
20
The positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for the highest ROE quintile (k=5) and the negative and statistically significant abnormal returns for the lowest ROE quintile (k=1) suggests that there is a missing factor in the conditional Fama-French-Carhart four factor model. The rejection of the hypothesis of jointly zero abnormal returns with the GRS statistic in the lowest ROE (k=1) and the highest ROE (k=5) quintiles is further evidence that there is a missing factor in the conditional Fama-French-Carhart four factor model for the two extreme ROE quintiles. The missing factor could be related to the other primary determinant of expected returns: earnings volatility. However, for ROE 1 , ROE 2 , and ROE 3 portfolios, Hansen's J-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of joint equality of abnormal returns for the five portfolios in almost all of the ROE quintiles.
Conclusion
We investigate a dynamic equity valuation model for non-dividend paying firms which predicts that expected return is the forward rate of return on equity (ROE) plus a term that depends on earnings volatility. Our empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that business investment opportunities are more limited for dividend paying companies (which is why they pay dividends rather than retain earnings) and that financing constraints are more likely binding for non-dividend paying firms. Consequently, dividend paying and non-dividend paying growth firms are very different in their risk/return profiles. High profitability reduces risk for dividend paying firms because, with limited investment opportunities, they cannot use this profitability to increase growth.
Instead, profitability reduces risk and expected return which leads to the value-premium for dividend paying firms reported by Blazenko and Fu (2010) . On the other hand, for non-dividend paying firms, profitability reduces financing constraints which increases growth, growth leverage, and expected return. Consistent with this prediction we report evidence of a negative value-premium for nondividend paying firms.
Like any good empirical analysis, our study suggests avenues for future research. First, because our dynamic equity valuation model presumes a geometric Brownian motion for ROE, and thus, because ROE is always positive, one of the screens we impose on firms for inclusion in our study is that they have positive trailing twelve month earnings at the time of portfolio formation. There are, of course, many firms that have negative earnings. These firms likely have greater bankruptcy risk and financial distress than the firms that we investigate in the current paper. An interesting study will be whether or not non-dividend paying firms with negative earnings have a negative value-premium or not. There are reasons to believe that they may or may not. If profitability reduces financing constraints which increases growth which increases growth leverage which increases expected return, then these firms, like those in the current paper, will have a negative value premium. On the other hand, profitability may reduce bankruptcy risk and financial distress which decreases risk and expected return. Either of these two forces may dominate, and thus, non-dividend paying firms with negative earnings could have either a positive or a negative value-premium.
Second, there is a literature (e.g., Easton et. al, 2002; Gebhardt et. al, 2001; and Gode and Mohanram, 2003) that calculates implicit expected equity return from share price and a static equity valuation model. The purpose of these implicit expected returns is for cost of capital determination and capital budgeting or value management with financial measures like residual income 16 and
17 This literature generally compares these measures against realized equity returns. In a study of seven expected return proxies, Easton and Monahan (2005) find that these proxies are unreliable and none has a positive association with realized returns. We use expected return in our dynamic equity valuation model in equation (1) only for guidance for testing the negative value-premium hypothesis for non-dividend paying firms. However, with appropriate heuristics and approximations, we could develop this theoretical measure into one that could be useful in cost of capital calculations.
If our purpose is to develop an unbiased measure of expected return, then the results we report in Table 1 suggest that the assumption of a random walk for ROE needs to be adjusted. For low ROE portfolios, average portfolio returns exceed ROE. Since this difference is so great, this discrepancy is likely to remain for any adjustment we make to ROE to make it into an expected return. For high ROE portfolios, ROE exceeds average portfolio returns. Since this difference is so great, this discrepancy is likely to remain for any adjustment we make to ROE to make it into an expected return. This bias can be created by sorting ROE if ROE follows a mean reverting process rather than the random walk that we presume in the current paper. We suspect that we can reduce this bias by modeling ROE as a mean reverting process and by estimating its parameters with shrinkage type estimators to generate a return measure that is a better proxy for expected return than is currently available in the financial literature.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we develop a dynamic three state growth model for equity valuation. In the first state, when profitability (ROE) is modest, the corporate manager does not grow the business. In the second state, the earnings rate is greater, but growth is constrained by financing. The corporate manager uses all of earnings for retention, reinvestment, and growth, and, thus, the corporate growth rate equals ROE. In the third state, ROE is high, but the business faces limits on growth. The manager pays dividends at the rate ROE-g>0 above that required to fund maximum growth, g. the manager decides to grow the business (at the rate ROE when the business is financially constrained and at the rate g when business growth is constrained).
The return on equity (ROE) follows a non-growing geometric diffusion,
where, σ is volatility of both ROE and earnings, t X , and dz is a Wiener process. There is no growth in capital efficiency. That is, ROE does not grow,
The return to business investment for shareholders is ROE, earnings divided by equity capital, X ROE B  , rather than ROE plus a growth factor (for example, ROE+g). ROE plus a growth factor is business return for a hypothetical investment with spontaneous profit growth-like a stand of timber that does not require ongoing investment.
18 However, this is not the nature of the investment we study. In our case, profit growth requires capital growth. Either in-place assets or expansion investments generate a non-growing perpetual stream of expected earnings, X, per dollar of equity capital, B. Regardless of the magnitude of the constraint on investment (ROE or g), the return on 23 business investment for shareholders, the internal rate of return (IRR), satisfies ROE/IRR-1=0 which means that IRR=ROE.
Because earnings is ROE times equity capital B, the process for earnings t X is , growth constrained by business opportunites , growth contrained by financing , no growth
The risk-adjusted process, ' X , for earnings is, 
where 0   is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion for a representative investor, xc  is the covariance of the log of operating profit, X, with the log of aggregate consumption, log( ) cC  , and aggregate consumption follows a geometric Brownian motion. 
V(X)
The left-hand side of equation (A5) is the return on the market value of equity at the riskless interest rate, r. The upper branch of the right-hand-side of equation (A5) is the rate of dividend payment above that required to finance growth (ROE-g), less a loss due to risk aversion ( , ' xc ROE   ), plus an expected capital gain due the curvature of the value function ( 22 "/ 2 ROE  ), plus the contribution of equity capital to value when capital is constrained to grow at the maximum rate g ( g ). The middle branch on the right-hand-side of equation (A5) is the same as the upper branch, but with growth set equal to ROE. In this case, dividend payment is zero, the retention ratio is one, and the firm grows at the maximum rate allowed by internal financing, ROE. The lower branch on the right-hand-side of equation (A5) is the same as the upper branch, but with growth set equal to zero. In this case, corporate growth is zero and the rate of dividend payment is ROE because the manager cannot not retain for future growth in our modeling.
The value maximizing return threshold for expansion at the rate ROE, *  , and the value maximizing return threshold for expansion at the rate g, *  , separates the market to book ratio 
c ROE
 is the value of the option to begin growth at some time in the future (if ROE increases above *  ). The middle branch of equation (A6) is the value of the business when the rate of earnings is ROE and the manager retains 100% of earnings for growth. He/she also has a dynamic option to suspend growth (if ROE falls below *  ) and is constrained to grow at the maximum rate g if ROE increases above ξ* .
Our valuation problem has six unknowns: the value maximizing return threshold for expansion at the rate g,  , the value maximizing return threshold for expansion at the rate ROE,  , and the four constants in equation (A6) 
, and 0  are the market to book ratios in the upper, middle, and lower branches of equation (A6) We need two more relations to ensure value maximization. We maximize the value function  on the "growth constrained by financing" branch of equation (A6) with respect to ξ , and  .
Equation (A8) has an expression in terms of model parameters and ξ and ψ. However, because this expression is long, we do not report it. Equations (A7) and (A8) are non-linear in ξ and ψ, and therefore, there is no closed form solution for the value maximizing R&D return thresholds, ξ* and ψ*. However, with numeric values for model parameters, the joint solution to equations (A7) and (A8) give a numeric solution for the value maximizing return thresholds for expansion at the rate g, ξ*, and the value maximizing expansion threshold for expansion at the rate ROE, ψ*. For a set of presumed parameters, Panel A of Figure 1 plots the value function  in its three regions as the ROE increases from 0 to 20%. k=1,2,3,4,5, v=1,2,3,4,5, 2,3,4,5, v=1,2,3,4,5 ,in month t = 1,2,…,   , for portfolio sets ROE J , J=1,2,3. R f,t , the riskless rate, is the yield on a US Government 1-month Treasury bill, R M,t , the return on the market portfolio, is the return on the CRSP value weighted index of common stocks in month t, SMB t and HML t are the small-minus-big and high-minus-low Fama-French factors, MOM t is the momentum factor in month t, and DY t-1 is the CRSP valueweighted index dividend yield lagged one period. t-statistics are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with lag length two. p-values underlie Hansen's J statistics and GRS statistics.
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